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THE IMPACT OF UNIFORM LAWS ON THE TEACHING OF 
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 
DAVID M. ENGLISH* 
INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in 1969 with the approval of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC),1 
uniform laws have had a major impact on the teaching of the basic Trusts and 
Estates course. This is not the place to list the close to thirty uniform acts 
relating to Trusts and Estates that have been approved.2 Rather, this Article 
will focus on the impact that uniform laws have had on the content of what is 
taught in the Trusts and Estates course. Uniform laws are not written in a 
vacuum. Like other legislative enactments, they are the product of societal 
changes and changes in legal culture. This article will attempt to place the 
various uniform law enactments and their impact on the teaching of Trusts and 
Estates within the context of these broader trends. The following trends will be 
discussed: 
I. The Decline of Probate 
II. The Increasing Use of Trusts 
III. The Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities 
IV. The Decline of the Federal Estate Tax 
V. The Changing American Family 
VI. The Rise of Elder Law 
I.  THE DECLINE OF PROBATE 
When an individual dies, the person’s assets can be broadly classified as 
either probate or nonprobate. In the case of a nonprobate asset, the document 
of title contains directions as to how the asset is to be transferred upon the 
owner’s death.3 The life insurance or retirement plan proceeds will pass as 
provided in a beneficiary designation, the joint bank account or payable-on-
 
* David English is the W.F. Fratcher Missouri Professor of Law at the University of Missouri. 
Professor English, who was the Reporter for the Uniform Trust Code, was from 1998–2013 the 
Executive Director of the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts. 
 1. UNIF. PROBATE CODE (amended 2010). 
 2. For such a list, see Thomas P. Gallanis, Trusts and Estates: Teaching Uniform Law, 58 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 671, 674–675 (2014). 
 3. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101. 
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death account will pass as provided in the signature card contract, joint tenancy 
or tenancy by the entireties real estate will pass as provided in the deed, and 
assets held in a revocable trust will pass as provided in the trust document. 
The “probate” assets are assets for which the document of title does not 
provide guidance. Probate assets include real estate held in fee simple or as 
tenants-in-common and personal property, whether tangible or intangible, held 
by the decedent in absolute ownership form. Probate assets are the only assets 
that pass under the will or to the heirs absent a will.4 These are also the only 
assets that must go through the administrative process supervised by the 
probate courts.5 In the case of nonprobate assets, no court involvement is 
necessary to transfer title and the court will rarely be involved except to 
resolve disputes.6 In the case of probate assets, the court must be involved in 
order to transfer title to the asset regardless of how routine the matter might 
be.7 
Efforts to simplify the probate process began decades before the UPC was 
approved in 1969. A Model Probate Code was promulgated by the American 
Bar Association’s Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law in 1946 but 
was not widely enacted.8 The big pressure for reform did not come from within 
the legal profession but from outside. In 1965, Norman Dacey published his 
bestselling book, How to Avoid Probate!;9 it was widely popular and 
stimulated the completion of the UPC.10 The flexible system of probate estate 
administration inaugurated by Article III of the UPC was described by its 
drafters as the “heart of the Uniform Probate Code.”11 The system includes an 
affidavit procedure for probate estates under $25,000,12 a summary 
administration procedure for probate estates for larger estates not in excess of 
the statutory allowances and expenses,13 and the option for the informal 
 
 4. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS, TRUSTS 
AND ESTATES: INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS § 13.1 (4th ed. 2010). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. For the genesis of the Model Probate Code, see Russell D. Niles, Model Probate Code 
and Monographs on Probate Law: A Review, 45 MICH. L. REV. 321 (1947). For the text of the 
Model Probate Code, see LEWIS M. SIMES & PAUL E. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 1–
238 (1946). 
 9. NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE (1965). 
 10. For a brief history of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), see John H. Martin, Principles 
of Probate Reform in Michigan, 12 OHIO PROB. L.J. 87 (2002). 
 11. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. III general cmt. (amended 2010). 
 12. Id. at § 3-1201. The original amount was $5000 but was inflation-adjusted upward to 
$25,000 in 2010. Id. at § 3-1201 2010 cmt. 
 13. Id. at § 3-1203. “If it appears from the inventory and appraisal that the value of the entire 
estate, less liens and encumbrances, does not exceed homestead allowance, exempt property, 
family allowance, costs and expenses of administration, reasonable funeral expenses, and 
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opening of the estate in front of a court clerk instead of a judge.14 Once an 
estate is opened and a personal representative is appointed, administration 
proceeds without the supervision of the court unless the court orders such 
supervision.15 Supervision by the court may be ordered only if directed in the 
will or if the court finds that supervised administration is necessary under the 
circumstances.16 The Uniform Law Commissioners have concluded that 
eighteen states have enacted the complete UPC.17 The UPC has also influenced 
reforms in many non-UPC states,18 including the many states that have enacted 
alternative simplified forms of estate administration not based on the UPC.19 
Despite these simplifications, the strong desire to avoid probate has 
continued. The simplified procedures have failed to address the public's 
concern for privacy or to substantially shorten the time or reduce the expense 
of estate settlement.20 The simplified probate process, because it still usually 
requires the appointment of a personal representative to administer the estate, 
is cumbersome when compared to the systems in many civil law countries 
where title passes automatically to the heirs or devisees at death and the 
appointment of a personal representative is rare.21 The various methods for 
transferring property by nonprobate means are now so well established that it 
is doubtful that probate will ever recover its formerly favored position. 
The standard Trusts and Estates course in the law school curriculum is 
three or four semester hours. Given the “nonprobate revolution,”22 it is logical 
that increased attention be paid to the various nonprobate transfers. Article VI 
of the UPC, entitled “Nonprobate Transfers on Death,” has also expanded over 
 
reasonable and necessary medical and hospital expenses of the last illness of the decedent, the 
personal representative may, without giving notice to creditors, immediately disburse and 
distribute the estate to the persons entitled thereto, and file a closing statement as provided in 
Section 3-1204.” 
 14. Id. at §§ 3-301 to 3-311. 
 15. Id. at art. III general cmt. 
 16. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-502. 
 17. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 2012–2013 REFERENCE BOOK 144 (2012) [hereinafter 
ULC REFERENCE BOOK] (reporting that the eighteen states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah). 
 18. See, e.g., Roger W. Andersen, The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in 
Nonadopting States, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599, 599–600 (1985). 
 19. For a description of the statutes, see John H. Martin, Non-Judicial Estate Settlement, 45 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 965, 969–71 (2012). 
 20. See id. at 966. 
 21. For a discussion of the civil law system, see MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH, supra note 
4, at § 13.2. 
 22. If the term was not coined by John Langbein, it has become associated with his work. 
See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984). 
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the years.23 Part 3, the Uniform TOD Security Registration Act, was added in 
1989.24 Part 4, the Uniform Real Property Transfer on Death Act, was added in 
2009.25 As discussed below, other topical areas, including trusts and elder law, 
have also increased in importance, putting additional pressure on coverage. It 
is perhaps not surprising that the preface to one of the leading trusts and estates 
casebooks notes that its authors have pruned away a step-by-step discussion of 
how to settle an estate, stating somewhat dismissively that this subject is easily 
learned from local practice books.26 With all of the other pressures on course 
coverage, the limits on available time can no longer justify spending extended 
time on a process that is so often avoided. 
II.  THE INCREASING USE OF TRUSTS 
While there are other ways to avoid probate, the method of choice, 
particularly among wealthier individuals, is the revocable trust. The settlor will 
typically name himself or herself as trustee, with a successor trustee designated 
to take over in the event of the settlor’s death or incapacity. To avoid probate, 
the settlor will usually re-register all of his or her otherwise probate-eligible 
assets into his or her name as trustee. Because the settlor might miss some 
assets, the settlor is advised to also execute a will with a “pour-over” provision, 
under which all assets passing under the will are transferred to the trustee of 
the revocable trust upon the conclusion of estate administration. But if the 
settlor successfully re-registers all assets into trust form, there will be no 
probate estate to be settled and no need to appoint a personal representative. 
Following the settlor’s death, the trust assets will be distributed to the settlor’s 
successors as provided in the trust document. 
Trusts are also increasingly being used to provide extra benefits for a 
disabled beneficiary who is otherwise eligible for government welfare 
programs, the principal programs being Medicaid, which pays for health care,27 
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which provides a monthly cash 
payment.28 To qualify for such benefits, an individual must usually have less 
than $2000 in “available” resources.29 The challenge is to draft the trust in such 
 
 23. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. VI Prefatory Note (amended 2010). 
 24. Id. This Act has been enacted in every state except Louisiana. ULC REFERENCE BOOK, 
supra note 17, at 145. 
 25. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. VI Prefatory Note. For an analysis of the UPC Article VI, 
Parts 1–3, see William M. McGovern, Jr., Nonprobate Transfers Under the Revised Uniform 
Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1329, 1329–30 (1992). 
 26. JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
ESTATES xxxii (8th ed. 2009). 
 27. JOHN J. REGAN, REBECCA C. MORGAN & DAVID M. ENGLISH, TAX, ESTATE & 
FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE ELDERLY § 10.02 (2013). 
 28. Id. at § 8.2. 
 29. Id. at §§ 8.12, 10.07[1]. 
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a way that the trust will not count as an available resource but will still allow 
distributions to be made from the trust to pay for “special needs” not 
compensated for by the government program. Special needs trusts are created 
either with the disabled person’s own assets, referred to as a “first-party” trust, 
or with the assets of another person such as a parent, referred to as a “third-
party” trust.30 
Additionally, trusts are being used increasingly to shield trust assets from 
the claims of a settlor’s creditors. Traditionally, a settlor could not be a 
beneficiary of a trust and at the same time shield assets of the trust from claims 
of the settlor’s creditors.31 Any trust property that could in the exercise of the 
trustee's discretion be distributed to the settlor-beneficiary was subject to the 
claims of the settlor’s creditors.32 The drafters of the Uniform Trust Code 
(UTC) followed the traditional approach, concluding that it reflected sound 
policy.33 But beginning with Alaska in 1997, fourteen U.S. states have enacted 
what are known as Domestic Asset Protection Trust (DAPT) statutes.34 A 
DAPT normally involves the appointment of a trust bank in the applicable state 
to act as trustee.35 If the other requirements of the particular state statute are 
met, the settlor-beneficiary may be eligible to receive discretionary 
distributions from the trust without the settlor’s creditors being able to reach 
the settlor’s beneficial interest.36 
Finally, and as discussed below, trusts can now be created to last longer 
than they could before. Twenty-nine US states have repealed or greatly scaled 
back the Rule Against Perpetuities, with nearly all of the enactments having 
occurred since 1995.37 In these states, trusts can last for periods ranging from 
360 to 1000 years and in nineteen of the states trusts can theoretically last 
forever.38 
Given these developments, it is not surprising that the Uniform Law 
Commissioners have paid more attention to trust issues in recent years. The 
hallmark was the approval of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) in 2000, which 
has subsequently been enacted in twenty-five states plus the District of 
 
 30. For an introduction to special needs trusts, see MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH, supra 
note 4, at § 9.7. 
 31. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 cmt. (amended 2010). 
 32. MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH, supra note 4, at § 9.8. 
 33. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(2) cmt. 
 34. Comparison of the Domestic Asset Protection Trust Statutes, ACTEC (June 30, 2012), 
http://www.actec.org/public/documents/studies/shaftel_dapt_chart_06_30_2012.pdf. 
 35. David G. Shaftel, IRS Letter Ruling Approves Estate Tax Planning Using Domestic Asset 
Protection Trusts, 112 J. TAX’N 213, 218 (2010). 
 36. See Comparison of the Domestic Asset Protection Trust Statutes, supra note 34. 
 37. Daniel J. Amato, Note, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Political Economy and 
Unintended Consequences of Perpetual Trusts, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 637, 654–55 (2013). 
 38. For a table of the states, see id. at 655. 
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Columbia.39 But it was preceded by the Uniform Prudent Investor Act in 1994, 
enacted in forty-one states plus the District of Columbia,40 and the 1997 
revision of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, enacted in forty-six states 
plus the District of Columbia.41 Although historically considered part of the 
law of property, the power of appointment is used today almost exclusively as 
a term of a trust. The 2013 approval of the Uniform Powers of Appointment 
Act completes the package of trust enactments.42 
Prior to the 1994 approval of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, the 
Commissioners had ventured into the subject of trusts only in tentative and 
incomplete ways. The misnamed Uniform Trusts Act of 1937, which was 
enacted in only six states, dealt with only a handful of topics, including the 
duty of loyalty, the registration and voting of securities, and trustee liability to 
persons other than beneficiaries.43 Article VII of the UPC, although 
ambitiously titled “Trust Administration,” similarly addressed only selected 
issues, including the jurisdiction of the court to hear trust disputes and the 
liability of trustees to persons other than beneficiaries.44 The Uniform Trustee 
Powers Act was approved in 1964 and as its name suggests, was known 
primarily for containing a list of specific trustee management powers.45 The 
most significant of the earlier Acts were the 1931 and 1962 versions of the 
Uniform Principal and Income Act, although unlike the 1997 version, it left 
many open issues.46 
 
 39. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Trust Code, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uni 
formlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trust%20Code (last visited Dec. 28, 2013). For an 
analysis of the UTC, see David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant 
Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143 (2002). 
 40. See Legislative Fact Sheet— Prudent Investor Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Prudent%20Investor%20Act (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2013). For an analysis of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, see John H. 
Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 
641 (1996). 
 41. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Principal and Income Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Principal%20and%20Income%20 
Act (last visited Dec. 28, 2013). For an analysis of the 1997 revision of the Uniform Principal and 
Income Act, see E. James Gamble, If it’s the 1990s, it Must be Time for Another Principal and 
Income Act, 32 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 8–1 (1998). 
 42. For the text of the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act as approved at the 
Commissioners’ 2013 Annual Meeting, see Uniform Powers of Appointment Act, UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Powers_of_Appointment/2013AM_UP 
AA_As%20approved.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2013). 
 43. UNIF. TRUST CODE Prefatory Note (amended 2010). 
 44. See id.; UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. VII (withdrawn 2010). 
 45. UNIF. TRUST CODE Prefatory Note. 
 46. For a comparison of the 1997 version with the predecessor acts, see Gamble, supra note 
41. 
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The more recent uniform acts relating to trusts have and will continue to 
transform the teaching of trust law. The Prudent Investor Act updated trust 
investment law to reflect the teaching of modern portfolio theory.47 The 1997 
revision of the Principal and Income Act provided a means to implement the 
emphasis in the Prudent Investor Act on investing for total return as opposed to 
predecessor Principal and Income Acts, which focused on production of certain 
levels of “income” in disregard of the total growth of the trust.48 Although the 
UTC contains a number of innovations, the UTC is most notable as the first 
national codification of the law of trusts.49 By making the law more accessible, 
the UTC makes trust law easier to teach. For example, the law on creation of 
trusts can now be taught directly from the UTC itself instead of from reading 
numerous cases.50 The codification of the common law of powers of 
appointment is the exclusive aim of the Uniform Powers of Appointment 
Act.51 It will likewise transform the teaching of that subject, allowing much of 
the law on powers of appointment to be taught directly from the Act itself 
instead of from cases. 
III.  THE REPEAL OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities is one of the foundation 
principles of American property law. Although not directed specifically at the 
duration of trusts, it regulated their duration indirectly by invalidating 
contingent beneficial interests that might vest too remotely.52 Over time the 
harshness of the common law was ameliorated by various reform doctrines 
including wait-and-see and cy pres,53 but the effect of the reforms was to make 
an already complicated subject even more difficult to teach. In order to 
understand the reforms, students first need to understand the common law 
Rule. The apex of the reform movement occurred in 1986, when the 
Commissioners approved the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities 
(USRAP), which approved wait-and-see as the preferred approach.54 At one 
point, twenty-eight states had enacted USRAP.55 
 
 47. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT Prefatory Note (1994). 
 48. UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT Prefatory Note (amended 2008). 
 49. UNIF. TRUST CODE Prefatory Note. 
 50. See id. at art. 4 general cmt. 
 51. UNIF. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT ACT Prefatory Note (2013). 
 52. For the operation of the Rule, see MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH, supra note 4, at § 
11.2. 
 53. For a summary of the reforms, see id. at § 11.4. 
 54. For an analysis of the Act, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule 
Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 569 (1986). 
 55. ULC REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 17, at 144. Although the current edition of the 
Reference Book lists twenty-eight states, twelve of those states plus the District of Columbia have 
subsequently passed legislation allowing perpetual or near-perpetual trusts. These states are 
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Ironically, USRAP was approved in 1986, the same year that Congress 
enacted the current version of the federal tax on generation-skipping transfers 
(GST).56 But at the same time that it imposed a tax on generation-skipping 
transfers, Congress created a $1,000,000 exemption from the GST tax for each 
transferor.57 The result was that a transferor could leave $1,000,000 in trust in 
perpetuity without the assessment of a transfer tax at the death of his or her 
children or any subsequent generation. But in order to create such a perpetual 
trust, state trust law needed to be reformed to eliminate or scale back the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. When the GST was enacted in 1986, only three states, 
Idaho, South Dakota and Wisconsin, had abolished the Rule or had never had 
the Rule in the first instance.58 Realizing a business opportunity, South Dakota 
financial institutions began to heavily market the perpetual trust in order to 
take maximum advantage of the GST exemption.59 Not wanting to lose out on 
trust business, beginning in 1995 other states began to repeal the rule.60 By 
2010, twenty-nine states had either repealed the rule in its entirety or allowed 
trusts to exist for very long periods ranging from 360 to 1000 years.61 The 
amounts of money potentially involved are enormous. One study estimated that 
through 2003, one hundred billion dollars in trust assets had flowed into states 
allowing perpetual or near-perpetual trusts.62 
With perpetual or near-perpetual trusts now allowed in a majority of U.S. 
states, an instructor may justifiably give the Rule Against Perpetuities a lower 
priority, particularly given other emerging topics demanding greater attention, 
including changes in the American family and the rise of elder law as 
discussed below. 
 
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Compare id., with Amato, supra 
note 37, at 655. 
 56. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1431, 100 Stat. 2085, 2717 is applicable 
to generation-skipping transfers made after October 22, 1986. 
 57. Id. at 2731 (enacting Internal Revenue Code § 2631(a)). 
 58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS) ch. 
27 Intro. Note (2011). 
 59. See id. 
 60. Amato, supra note 37, at 655. 
 61. The history of the repeal movement is most completely described in Jesse Dukeminier & 
James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303 (2003). For the most 
current list of the state statutes, see Amato, supra note 37, at 655. 
 62. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust 
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 410–11 (2005). 
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IV.  THE DECLINE OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX 
Prior to 1977, the federal estate tax exemption was $60,000.63 Thereafter, 
Congress repeatedly increased the exemption until it reached $675,000 in 
2001.64 Congress then enacted even more dramatic increases.65 For individuals 
dying in 2002–03, the exemption was $1,000,000;66 in 2004–05, $1,500,000;67 
in 2006–08, $2,000,000;68 and in 2009, $3,500,000.69 The estate tax was 
initially repealed for deaths occurring in 2010, but it was retroactively 
reinstated in late 2010 with an exemption of $5,000,000.70 In early 2013, the 
$5,000,000 exemption with adjustments for inflation was made permanent.71 
For deaths occurring in 2013 the exemption is $5,250,000.72 
The increase in the federal estate tax exemption has resulted in a drastic 
reduction in the number of decedents subject to the federal estate tax. 
According to a study by the Tax Policy Center, a total of 99,100 estate tax 
returns would have been due had the exemption in 2011 dropped back to 
$1,000,000, but only 8600 were required at a $5,000,000 exemption amount.73 
This 8600 is only a little more than three-tenths of one percent of the 
projected 2,586,000 deaths that occurred during the year.74 
Because the Uniform Law Commission drafts state and not federal statutes, 
the involvement of the Commission with federal tax issues is necessarily 
limited. However, how property is taxed for federal tax purposes frequently 
depends on state law. For example, the provisions of the UTC relating to 
judicial modification of trusts will be employed frequently to qualify a trust for 
federal tax benefits.75 Also, state law on tax apportionment will determine 
 
 63. Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety Years 
and Counting, IRS 122, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 
2013). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 
521(a), 115 Stat. 38, 71. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302(c)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 3296, 3301. 
 71. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313, 
2315 (2013). 
 72. Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444, 448. 
 73. See Table T11-0156: Estate Tax Returns and Liability Under Current Law and Various 
Reform Proposals, 2011–2021, TAX POLICY CENTER (June 2, 2011), http://taxpolicycenter.org/ 
numbers/displayatab.cfm?Docid=3037&DocTypeID=7. 
 74. Id. 
 75. The provisions relating to judicial modification of trusts are found at UNIF. TRUST CODE 
§§ 412–16 (amended 2010), and are discussed in English, supra note 39, at 169–76. For a 
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which beneficial interests in the estate will be charged with payment of the 
federal estate tax. In 1999, the Commission announced a project to revise the 
Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, which was first approved in 1958.76 
When the project was announced, the federal estate tax exemption was 
$650,000.77 When the revised Act was completed in 2003, the exemption had 
increased to $1,000,000,78 but as discussed above, even more significant 
increases were already on the horizon. Despite the steep declines in the number 
of decedents subject to the federal estate tax, the revised Act has received 
eleven enactments to date.79 
Many trusts and estates casebooks and other student texts contain a chapter 
on the estate and gift tax.80 This material was presumably included on the 
assumption that some instructors might want to include a tax unit in the basic 
course. Given the drastic decrease in the number of decedents subject to the 
federal estate tax and other emerging topics competing for the instructor’s 
attention, perhaps it would be better to reserve the tax material for the 
advanced estate planning seminar. 
V.  THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY 
Because Trusts and Estates concern primarily disposition of property 
among family members, it should perhaps not be surprising that changes in the 
American family have affected the reform of the law of trusts and estates and 
the teaching of the course in law schools. As the American family has become 
more complex, so have related trusts and estates topics and the time required to 
teach them. Discussed here are the rules of intestate succession, the spousal 
elective share, and the interpretation of terms of relationship in estate planning 
documents. 
Under the English Statute of Distribution of 1670, if the decedent did not 
leave a valid will, the surviving spouse was entitled to one-third of the 
decedent’s personal estate if the decedent was survived by descendants and to 
 
discussion of the limited circumstances when a state court modification will be binding on the 
Internal Revenue Service, see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 416 cmt. 
 76. UNIF. ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT ACT Prefatory Note (amended 2003). 
 77. See Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 63, at 122. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Legislative Fact Sheet—Estate Tax Apportionment and Probate Code 3-916, UNIFORM 
LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Estate%20Tax 
%20Apportionment%20and%20Probate%20Code%203-916 (visited Dec. 29, 2013). For an 
analysis of the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, see Douglas A. Kahn, The 2003 Revised 
Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 613 (2004). 
 80. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, supra note 26, at 935, 948; ROGER W. 
ANDERSEN, UNDERSTANDING TRUSTS AND ESTATES ch. 14 (4th ed. 2009); WILLIAM M. 
MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID M. ENGLISH, PRINCIPLES OF WILLS, TRUSTS AND 
ESTATES 706, 720 (2d ed. 2012). 
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one-half if the decedent had no descendants or no descendants survived.81 With 
regard to real property, a surviving wife was entitled to a lifetime dower 
interest in the husband’s lands and a surviving husband was entitled to a 
lifetime curtesy interest in the lands owned by his deceased wife.82 Dower and 
curtesy have long been abolished in all but a few American states,83 but, like 
the English Statute of Distribution, in many states the share of the spouse 
remains a fixed fraction regardless of the size of the estate and whether the 
children are from the current or former marriage. Illinois is a typical example. 
The surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of the intestate estate if the 
decedent was survived by descendants and to the entire estate if only other 
relatives survived.84 
The UPC’s intestacy statute takes a different approach. Based on empirical 
studies of how decedents who make wills actually leave their property,85 the 
drafters of the UPC have varied the spouse’s share based on whether the 
decedent and spouse have common children and whether the decedent or 
spouse have descendants from another relationship.86 In situations where the 
decedent and spouse have children and neither have descendants from another 
relationship, decedents making wills typically leave their entire estate to their 
spouses on the assumption that the spouse will provide for the descendants. 
But in blended families, decedents who make wills tend to leave a portion of 
their estates to their own descendants unless the estate is small.87 
 
 81. An Act for the better setling of Intestates Estates, 1670, 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10, § 3 (Gr. 
Brit.). 
 82. For historical background on dower and curtesy, see 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW 185–97 (3d ed. 1923). 
 83. See CAROLE SHAMMAS, MARYLYNN SALMON & MICHEL DAHLIN, INHERITANCE IN 
AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 165 (1987) (noting that between 1890 and 
1982 the percentage of common law states limiting the spouse to a life estate in the decedent’s 
lands fell from sixty-nine percent to less than twelve percent). 
 84. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1(a), (c) (West 2007). 
 85. The studies are listed in UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 cmt. (amended 2010). 
 86. See id. at § 2-102. 
 87. The theory of the UPC spousal intestacy provisions is discussed in Lawrence W. 
Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Revised Uniform 
Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 229–35 (1991). UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 provides: 
“The intestate share of a decedent’s surviving spouse is: (1) the entire intestate estate if: (A) no 
descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent; or (B) all of the decedent’s surviving 
descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of the 
surviving spouse who survives the decedent; (2) the first [$300,000], plus three-fourths of any 
balance of the intestate estate, if no descendant of the decedent survives the decedent, but a parent 
of the decedent survives the decedent; (3) the first [$225,000], plus one-half of any balance of the 
intestate estate, if all of the decedent’s surviving descendants are also descendants of the 
surviving spouse and the surviving spouse has one or more surviving descendants who are not 
descendants of the decedent; (4) the first [$150,000], plus one-half of any balance of the intestate 
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When dower was repealed, it was replaced by the elective share, which 
granted a spouse a right to elect against the will and receive a minimum 
fraction of the probate estate, typically a third.88 But as nonprobate transfers 
became more common and easier to create, the elective share became easy to 
evade. The original UPC, which was approved in 1969 and is sometimes 
referred to as UPC I, addressed this problem of evasion by introducing the 
concept of the “augmented” estate, under which the surviving spouse was 
guaranteed a minimum of a third of the decedent’s combined probate and 
nonprobate transfers.89 
The “augmented” estate elective share approach differs from the way 
property is divided in community property states where all assets acquired by 
reason of the marriage are owned equally by the couple as community 
property.90 The augmented estate approach also conflicts with the way property 
is divided in a divorce. In a method of division known as “equitable 
distribution,” each divorcing spouse will presumptively receive an equal share 
of the “marital” property.91 The thought behind equitable distribution is that 
marriage should be viewed as a partnership and that property acquired by 
reason of this partnership should be divided equally. Because a married couple 
in a community property state have an equal ownership right in the community 
property at all times during the marriage, the division of the community at the 
death of one of the couple is well accepted and can be done with minimum 
dispute. Achieving a similar division would be much more difficult in a 
common law jurisdiction, where ownership follows title and the marital 
property rights of the other spouse attach only at two points in time, at divorce 
and at death. In addition, there is a reluctance at death to give the court the 
same power it has at divorce to equitably adjust the spousal shares. More 
certainty is desired. The elective share provisions of UPC II, approved in 1990, 
attempt to implement a partnership approach but are admittedly only a rough 
approximation of the results achieved under a community property system.92 
To avoid having to compute exactly which property of the couple was acquired 
by reason of the marriage and which was acquired from other sources, UPC II 
assumes that in a marriage of fifteen years or longer, all of the couple’s 
 
estate, if one or more of the decedent’s surviving descendants are not descendants of the 
surviving spouse.” 
 88. Id. at § 2-112 (noting that dower and curtesy are abolished); see also Sheldon F. Kurtz, 
The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable 
Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981, 988–91 (1977). 
 89. The elective share system of UPC I is discussed in id. at 1011–61. 
 90. MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH, supra note 4, at § 3.8. 
 91. For a survey of the various approaches, see Joseph W. McKnight, Defining Property 
Subject to Division at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 193, 193–97 (1989). 
 92. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2 general cmt. 
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property was acquired by reason of the marriage.93 A lower percentage is 
applied to marriages of shorter durations. For marriages of fifteen years or 
longer, the surviving spouse is entitled to end up with at least fifty percent of 
the couple’s combined assets or a minimum of $75,000.94 Unlike UPC I, where 
the surviving spouse was always entitled to a minimum third of the decedent’s 
estate regardless of the size of the spouse’s own estate, under UPC II, an 
elective share will be denied to a spouse who already owns in value more than 
fifty percent of the couple’s combined assets.95 
Defining who is a child is important whether or not the decedent has a will. 
If the child was adopted, born out-of-wedlock, or conceived posthumously, is 
the “child” entitled to take an intestate share of the estate or entitled to take as 
a “child” or “descendant” under the decedent’s will or other estate planning 
document? Although such questions are not new, they have increased in 
importance as the number of children born out-of-wedlock has increased over 
the past thirty years from eighteen percent to nearly forty percent of births96 
and the use of artificial reproductive technology (ART) to produce children has 
rapidly grown. In 2010, 61,564 children were born with the assistance of 
ART.97 The provisions of the UPC on adoption and children born out-of-
wedlock were most recently revised in 2008 at the same time as the provisions 
on ART were approved.98 
The UPC provisions on non-marital children are more notable for what 
they omit than for what they contain. Unlike the New York inheritance statute 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lalli v. Lalli,99 the UPC does not require 
that paternity be adjudicated during the father’s lifetime.100 Nor does the 
statute limit how paternity can be established.101 The definition of “genetic 
father” contemplates that paternity can be established using any method of 
 
 93. See id. § 2-203(b). 
 94. See id. § 2-202(b). 
 95. See id. at §§ 2-201 to 2-214. For an analysis of these provisions, see Waggoner, supra 
note 87, at 235–53. 
 96. See U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Stephanie J. Ventura, Changing Patterns of 
Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 18, May 2009, at 1, 2. 
 97. See Section 5: ART Trends 2001–2010, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2010/section5.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2013). 
 98. The provisions on ART are analyzed in Sheldon F. Kurtz & Lawrence W. Waggoner, 
The UPC Addresses the Class-Gift and Intestacy Rights of Children of Assisted Reproduction 
Technologies, 35 ACTEC J. 30 (2009) and in MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH, supra note 4, at § 
2.11. This section follows the section on non-marital children, id. at § 2.9, and the section on 
adoption, id. at § 2.10. 
 99. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). 
 100. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115(5) and Legislative Note. 
 101. Id. at § 2-115(5). 
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proof that might be available under the Uniform Parentage Act or other local 
law.102 
The UPC provisions on adoption generally follow the prevailing approach 
under American law that adoption completely severs inheritance ties with the 
genetic family and substitutes the adoptive family in its place. But there are a 
number of circumstances where there often will be a continuing relationship 
with members of the genetic family. On the other hand, the desire for certainty 
in estate administration dictates that exceptions to the full substitution 
approach be carefully defined and limited. The UPC hopefully achieves the 
appropriate balance. The exceptions under which the child may continue to 
inherit from the genetic relative include the right to inherit from and through 
the excluded genetic parent in a stepparent adoption,103 a continued right to 
inherit through the genetic relationship when the child is adopted by a genetic 
relative,104 and the continued right to inherit from the relatives of the genetic 
parents when the child is adopted following the death of both parents.105 These 
are also common situations where the will or other estate planning documents 
of the genetic parent or other relative will likely refer to “children” or 
“descendants” without expressly stating whether the adoptee is to be included 
within such terms. Under the UPC, the creation of an inheritance tie with the 
genetic parent or other relative will trigger the application of a rule of 
construction that will include the adoptee within terms of family relationship 
used in the document.106 
UPC Sections 2-120 and 2-121 deal with children born by means of 
ART.107 Section 2-120 applies to children born outside of the surrogacy 
context.108 Section 2-121 is applicable to children born to surrogates.109 If a 
husband and wife conceive a child through artificial insemination or in vitro 
fertilization, a parent-child relationship is deemed to exist between the child 
and both parents.110 If a sperm or egg donor was used and appropriate consents 
were obtained, the husband will be treated as the father and the wife as the 
mother.111 Somewhat more complicated rules apply if the intended parents are 
unmarried, whether of the same or different sex. Without taking a position on 
the enforceability of surrogacy agreements, the UPC provides that an 
inheritance tie is created with the intended parent, either as established by court 
 
 102. Id. at § 2-115(5) and Legislative Note. 
 103. Id. at § 2-119(b). 
 104. Id. at § 2-119(c). 
 105. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(d). 
 106. Id. at § 2-705(b). 
 107. Id. at §§ 2-120, 2-121. 
 108. Id. at § 2-120. 
 109. Id. at § 2-121. 
 110. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(d). 
 111. Id. at § 2-120(f). 
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order112 or if the intended parent actually functions as a parent within two years 
of the child’s birth.113 With regard to children posthumously conceived with 
the deceased husband’s sperm, the husband will be treated as the father if it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the husband intended to be 
treated as the father.114 Ideally, this issue will have been addressed in the donor 
agreement. 
VI.  THE RISE OF ELDER LAW 
Elder law is the study of legal issues that exclusively or disproportionately 
impact the elderly (generally, persons age sixty-five or older). Elder law 
includes the study of government benefit programs (Medicaid, Supplemental 
Security Income, Social Security, Medicare), issues related to the provision of 
long-term care, and problems related to planning for mental incapacity and 
termination of life-support. Elder law emphasizes life-care planning, with the 
usual goal to avoid the appointment of a guardian or conservator. To plan for 
management of property, the typical tools are the durable power of attorney 
and sometimes the revocable trust. To plan for healthcare decisions, the 
available tools include the durable power of attorney for health care or the 
living will. Paying for health care is also a major concern. Medicare has many 
gaps. To cover these gaps, most elderly persons purchase Medigap policies. 
Many also purchase long-term care insurance. 
None of these problems are new, but they have grown in importance as the 
percentage of the elderly population has increased. In 2010, there were slightly 
over forty million Americans age sixty-five or older.115 By 2050, the number 
will exceed eighty-eight million.116 Life expectancies are also increasing. In 
1990, the average life expectancy was 75.4 years,117 and in 2010, it was 78.3 
years.118 By 2030, life expectancy is projected to increase to 81.5 years.119 
 
 112. Id. at § 2-121(b). 
 113. Id. at § 2-121(d). 
 114. Id. at § 2-120(f)(2)(C). 
 115. See Projected Future Growth of the Older Population, ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, 
http://www.aoa.gov/AoARoot/Aging_Statistics/future_growth/future_growth.aspx#age (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2013) (select “Persons 65 and older” under the “By Age: 1900–2050” heading to 
download Excel data file). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Table 104. Expectation of Life at Birth, 1970 to 2008, and Projections, 2010 to 2020, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0104.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2013). 
 118. Id. 
 119. 2012 National Population Projections: Summary Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/population/projections/data/national/2012/summarytables.html (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2013) (select “Middle Series” XLS immediately under “Table 10. Projected Life 
Expectancy at Birth by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the United States: 2015 to 2060” to 
download Excel data file). 
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The use of the term “elder law” can be traced to the 1987 founding of the 
National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA).120 While now a 
recognized specialty law field, there is a considerable overlap between elder 
law and trusts and estates. Several of the subject areas identified by the 
National Elder Law Foundation as constituting “elder law,”121 including health 
and personal planning, pre-mortem legal planning, fiduciary representation, 
and legal capacity counseling, are subjects handled on a regular basis by 
attorneys specializing in trusts and estates. Perhaps the difference between the 
two fields is more one of emphasis than of degree, with elder law attorneys 
more focused on public benefit and long-term care issues than those who call 
themselves estate planners. 
More than half of all U.S. law schools offer a separate class in elder law.122 
Given the widespread availability of a separate class, perhaps the teachers of 
Trusts and Estates should tread only lightly into the related field of elder law. 
Among the authors of the standard Trusts and Estates casebooks and treatises, 
it appears that a consensus has emerged. Given that planning for incapacity and 
the preparation of powers of attorney for property or health care has long been 
a standard practice of estate planning attorneys, all of the books include a 
segment or chapter on planning for incapacity but not on other elder law 
topics.123 These segments or chapters contain brief descriptions of the 
guardianship process, but focus mostly on the use of powers of attorney and 
planning for the end of life.124 
The Uniform Law Commission has approved several acts relating to elder 
law topics. These include the Uniform Guardianship and Protective 
Proceedings Act, last extensively revised in 1997,125 and the Uniform Health-
 
 120. Amelia E. Pohl, Introduction: What is Elder Law Anyway?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 459, 459 
(1995). 
 121. The twelve areas are health and personal care planning, pre-mortem legal planning, 
fiduciary representation, legal capacity counseling, public benefits advice, special needs 
counseling, advice on insurance matters, resident rights counseling, housing counseling, 
employment and retirement advice, age and disability discrimination, and litigation with respect 
to any of the above. Program for the Certification of Elder Law Attorneys, NATIONAL ELDER 
LAW FOUNDATION 8, http://www.nelf.org/pdf/NELF_Certification_Book11.pdf (last visited Dec. 
30, 2013). 
 122. See Nina A. Kohn & Edward D. Spurgeon, Elder Law Teaching and Scholarship: An 
Empirical Analysis of an Evolving Field, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 414, 418 (2010) (elder course listed 
in curriculum of 112 out of 192 law schools). 
 123. DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, supra note 26, at 448–68; MCGOVERN, KURTZ & 
ENGLISH, supra note 4, at §§ 14.1–14.7; ANDERSEN, supra note 80, at 125–32. 
 124. See DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, supra note 26, at 448–68; MCGOVERN, KURTZ 
& ENGLISH, supra note 4, at §§ 14.1–14.7; ANDERSEN, supra note 80, at 125–32. 
 125. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT (amended 1998). See David 
M. English & Rebecca C. Morgan, The Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act 
(1997), 11 NAELA Q., Spring/Summer 1998, at 3, 3. 
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Care Decisions Act, approved in 1993.126 A major Uniform Power of Attorney 
Act was approved in 2006,127 and an act addressing issues of granny snatching 
and guardianship jurisdiction, the Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective 
Proceedings Jurisdiction Act, was approved in 2007.128 
CONCLUSION 
As this Article has hopefully demonstrated, uniform laws have played an 
important role in the teaching of Trusts and Estates in the United States. The 
UPC and UTC are the two acts most often mentioned, but many other acts 
cited in this Article are also cited and discussed in the Trusts and Estates 
casebooks and treatises. Over time, certain subject areas, such as probate, have 
received less attention, and others, such as the use of trusts and the impact of 
the changing American family, have received more attention. New issues will 
undoubtedly emerge in the coming decades. Hopefully, the close connection 
between the development of new uniform laws and the teaching of Trusts and 
Estates will continue. 
  
 
 126. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT (1993). See David M. English & Alan Meisel, 
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act Gives New Guidance, 21 EST. PLAN. 355 (1994). 
 127. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT (2006). See Linda S. Whitton, The Uniform Power of 
Attorney Act: Striking a Balance Between Autonomy and Protection, 1 PHX. L. REV. 343 (2008). 
 128. For information on this Act, see the Commissioners’ webpage for the Act. Adult 
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Adult%20Guardianship%20and%20Protective%20 
Proceedings%20Jurisdiction%20Act (last visited Dec. 30, 2013). 
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